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Abstract 
 
This study addresses the apparent puzzle that China achieved spectacular economic 
performance despite weak institutions. Using a World Bank survey of 1,566 
manufacturing enterprises in 18 Chinese cities, we investigated whether property rights 
protection mattered for enterprise performance.  We found that property rights protection 
had a positive and statistically significant impact on enterprise productivity. Two-step 
GMM estimation and the difference-in-differences estimation further established the 
causal impacts of property rights protection on enterprise productivity. These findings 
were robust to various controls, outliers, and alternative measures of productivity and 
property rights protection.   
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Numerous cross-country and within-country studies have shown that institutions are 
fundamental to economic performance (Besley, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1995, 1997; 
Mauro, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 
1999; and Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001, 2002).  Indeed, the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund have stressed the importance of sound institutions in the 
growth of developing economies (Carothers 2006; Economist, March 15, 2008). 
 
However, the record of the Chinese economy over the past thirty years seems to 
contradict the scholarly finding that institutions are essential to economic performance.   
Until recently, China provided little formal protection of private property, e.g., protection 
of private properties was not written into China’s Constitution until 2004 (Blanchard and 
Kremer, 1997; Rodrik, 2004a and 2004b; Allen, Qian, and Qian, 2005; Economist, March 
15, 2008).  Nevertheless, China’s economic performance has been nothing less than 
spectacular.   
 
Did institutions really not matter for the performance of the Chinese economy? 
One possible explanation is that de facto institutional quality varied widely across China 
(Du, Lu, and Tao, 2008; World Bank, 2008; Lu and Tao, 2009a), and that China’s 
economic development was concentrated in those regions where institutions are 
reasonably good.1  This might possibly explain the apparent contradiction between the 
poor state of China’s institutions and the country’s spectacular economic performance at 
the macro level.  
 
Here, using detailed data at the enterprise level, we were able to address the China 
puzzle (i.e., that institutions were not important for economic performance) at the 
microeconomic level.  We focused on the protection of private properties, which is 
arguably the most important aspect of institutions (North, 1991; Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson, 2001; Besley and Ghatak, 2009). Specifically, we investigated whether 
enterprises enjoying better property rights protection exhibited better performance.  
 
                                                 
1 Another possible explanation is that the importance of institutions varied across industries and 
that China’s economic development was concentrated among industries for which institutions are 
less important.   
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We drew on the Survey of Chinese Enterprises, conducted by the World Bank 
with the Enterprise Survey Organization of China in early 2003.2 The data set covered 
1,566 enterprises drawn from 9 manufacturing industries and 18 cities. To measure 
enterprise performance, we used labor productivity, i.e., the logarithm of output per 
worker of an enterprise, and total factor productivity estimated using either the panel 
fixed-effect method or the methodology developed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).  Our 
focus on productivity was motivated by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), who 
studied the impact of institutions on income per capita, and interpreted the results as 
providing implications for the impact of institutions on economic growth.  
 
The quality of property rights protection can be measured by the effectiveness of 
various means for addressing disputes associated with private properties. One of the 
means for resolving disputes is court litigation, and the other is to seek help from the 
state.3 To measure the effectiveness of court litigation, we used the perceived likelihood 
that the legal system will uphold contract and property rights in business disputes. To 
measure the effectiveness of seeking help from the state, we used the perceived share of 
government officials oriented toward helping firms.  
 
Recent studies in political economy pointed out that the role of state in codifying 
and protecting private properties is more important than court litigation (Besley and 
Ghatak, 2009). This is especially so in the case of China. The legal institutions, which 
were not needed at all under China’s central planning economy prior 1978, were too slow 
to adapt to complicated and fast-changing environment, and were short of autonomous 
enforcement powers in China (e.g., Fan, 1985; Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988; Zhao, 
1989; Li, Zhang, and Wang, 1990; Clarke, 1991). In contrast, even after thirty years of 
economic reform, government officials remained heavily involved in interpreting and 
enforcing national laws and ordinances. As a result, we focused mainly on the 
effectiveness of seeking help from the state as the measure of property rights protection, 
and used the effectiveness of court litigation as an alternative measure of property rights 
protection in the robustness check.  
 
                                                 
2 The data set has recently been used by Cull and Xu (2005), Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Maksimovic (2007), and Dong and Xu (2009), among others. 
3 These two means for resolving disputes are formally called litigation through courts and 
regulatory state by Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003). 
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We found that an enterprise perceiving better protection of property rights had a 
statistically significantly higher productivity.  In order to conclude that this relation was 
indeed due to a causal impact, that stronger protection of property rights increased 
productivity, we ruled out a number of alternative explanations and conducted various 
robustness checks. 
 
First, we checked that our finding was not driven by some omitted variables. We 
introduced a host of covariates related to CEO characteristics (such as human capital and 
political capital) and enterprise characteristics (such as enterprise size, enterprise age, 
private ownership percentage, and skilled labor ratio) used in previous research, as well 
as industry and city dummies.  Our result was robust to the inclusion of these controls.  It 
is also important to note that the positive impact of property rights protection on 
productivity became smaller with the inclusion of city dummies, which supports our 
earlier conjecture that part of the China puzzle could be explained by the concentration of 
growth in particular geographical areas with better institutions. 
 
Second, we worried that our finding might still be biased due to some unobserved 
characteristic correlated with both expropriation and productivity.  To address such 
potential endogeneity, we used the two-step Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimation with two alternative instruments for property rights protection, viz., the 
average assessment of property rights protection by enterprises of other industries located 
in the same city, and the logarithm of population in the respective city around 1918-19. 
The two-step GMM estimates reinforced our findings that property rights protection had 
a positive and significant causal impact on productivity. 
 
Third, we applied the difference-in-differences method of Rajan and Zingales 
(1998).  Following Blanchard and Kremer (1997) and Rajan and Subramanian (2007), we 
used the number of suppliers to measure, for each enterprise, its reliance on the external 
environment.  We found that enterprises which were more reliant on the external 
environment (in the sense of using more external suppliers) exhibited relatively higher 
productivity in cities with stronger property rights protection. In addition, following 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002), we used the number of days to 
register a new business to measure, for each enterprise, the level of entry barriers. We 
found that enterprises which faced lower entry barriers exhibited relatively higher 
productivity in cities with stronger property rights protection.  
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In further robustness checks, we explored alternative measures of productivity 
and property rights protection, used quantile regressions to deal with possible impact of 
outlying observations, and investigated whether the results were biased due to the 
inclusion of state-owned enterprises.  
 
In a recent study, Fang and Zhao (2007) also addressed the China puzzle in a 
cross-section of 47 Chinese cities.  They found that property rights did have a significant 
effect on income, as measured by log GDP per capita. They used city-level measures of 
property rights from surveys by Ni et al. (2004, 2005) instrumented by a historical 
measure, viz., lower primary enrolment in missionary schools in 1919.  Our study 
differed from that of Fang and Zhao (2007) in two important ways: (i) our study was at 
the level of individual enterprises rather than cities, hence revealing possible differences 
among enterprises and between industries within the same city; and (ii) our study did not 
rely on just one identification strategy -- we applied three estimation methods, 
specifically, ordinary least squares with multiple controls, the two-step generalized 
method of moments with two alternative instruments, and the Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
difference-in-differences method of exploiting differences in external dependence and 
entry barriers.4   
 
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the data 
and variables for the empirical study, while Section 3 presents the main results. The paper 
concludes with Section 4. 
 
2. Data and Variables 
 
Our empirical analysis drew on data from the Survey of Chinese Enterprises (SCE), 
conducted by the World Bank in cooperation with the Enterprise Survey Organization of 
China in early 2003. For balanced representation, the SCE selected 18 cities from five 
regions of China: Northeast – Benxi, Changchun, Dalian, and Haerbin; Coastal region – 
Hangzhou, Jiangmen, Shenzhen, and Wenzhou; Central China – Changsha, Nanchang, 
                                                 
4   With regard to Fang and Zhao’s instrument, the enrolment in lower primary Christian 
missionary schools in 1919 was only 7.2 out of 10000 people.  As might be expected, this small 
proportion was a weak predictor of the quality of institutions.  Indeed, the value of the F-statistic 
in their first-stage regression was 7.77, which falls below the critical value of 10 (Staiger and 
Stock 1997). 
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Wuhan, and Zhengzhou; Southwest – Chongqing, Guiyang, Kunming, and Nanning; and 
Northwest – Lanzhou and Xi’an. 
In each city, the SCE randomly sampled 100 or 150 enterprises from 9 
manufacturing industries (garment and leather products, electronic equipment, electronic 
parts making, household electronics, auto and auto parts, food processing, chemical 
products and medicine, biotech products and Chinese medicine, and metallurgical 
products), and 5 service industries (transportation service, information technology, 
accounting and non-banking financial services, advertisement and marketing, and 
business services).  The total number of enterprises surveyed was 2,400.  
The SCE comprised two parts.  One was a general questionnaire directed at the 
senior management seeking information about the enterprise, such as innovation, product 
certification, marketing, relations with suppliers and customers, access to markets and 
technology, relations with government, labor, infrastructure, international trade, finance 
and taxation, and the CEO and board of directors.  The other questionnaire was directed 
at the accountant and personnel manager, covering ownership, various financial measures, 
and labor and training.  Most of the information from the first part of SCE pertained to 
the survey year – 2002, while the second part pertained to the period 2000-2002.  
We were concerned with the impact of institutions on the productivity of the 
enterprise.  As manufacturing enterprises generally have more complicated supply chains 
than those of service enterprises, and furthermore their productivity is easier to measure 
and interpret, we focused on a subset of 1,566 manufacturing enterprises. 
Our dependent variable was enterprise productivity. One measure was labor 
productivity, which was calculated as the logarithm of total output divided by total 
employment.5  An alternative measure would be total factor productivity (TFP), 
estimated using either the panel fixed-effect method or the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
methodology.  As information about material inputs was fragmentary (missing in more 
                                                 
5 Note that output was a revenue-based measure rather than quantity-based. In order to recover 
the quantity-based measure of output, we need the enterprise-level price to deflate the revenue. 
Since enterprise-level prices are rarely available, a commonly-used way in the literature is to 
deflate the revenue-based output by the industry average price index.  This procedure, however, 
introduces omitted price bias (Klette and Griliches, 1996). One way to address this problem is to 
assume a constant elasticity of substitution demand function and include industry total output as 
an additional control (Klette and Griliches, 1996; De Loecker, 2009). Accordingly, in most of our 
regressions, we included industry dummies, which, in a cross-section analysis, was essentially 
similar to the method of recovering the quantity-based output.  
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than 25% of the sample), we used labor productivity for the main analysis, and total 
factor productivity as a robustness check.   
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the data, while Table 2 reports bivariate 
correlations.  Referring to Table 1, the mean value of labor productivity was 4.322 
(±1.562) thousand Yuan per worker, while TFP was 4.151 (±1.077), as estimated by the 
fixed-effect method, and 3.042 (±0.953), as estimated by the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
method.  
-- Table 1 --- 
-- Table 2 --- 
Our key explanatory variable was the quality of property rights protection, which 
is arguably the most important aspect of institutions (North, 1991; Acemoglu, Johnson, 
and Robinson, 2001; Besley and Ghatak, 2009).  When there is a violation of private 
properties (say, a buyer defaults on his payment after receiving a good from a seller, or 
the user of an asset refuses to pay the owner of the asset for usage), there are two ways 
through which the owner of the good or the asset can protect his property rights. One is to 
sue the violator in the court (court litigation), and the other is to seek help from the state.  
Recent studies in political economy pointed out that the role of state in codifying 
and protecting private properties can be more important than court litigation. For example, 
Besley and Ghatak (2009) argue that “while historically non-state actors have played a 
key role in the creation and enforcement of rights, in the modern world weak property 
rights boils down to the way that the state functions.” 
This is especially so in the case of China where legal institutions were weak but 
the state maintained strong control of the economy even after thirty years of transition 
towards a market economy. Due to the substantial variations in endowments, 
socioeconomic development and culture across regions as well as fast-changing 
environments, laws and national ordinances enacted in China tend to be sketchy and 
incomplete. In this situation, the power to interpret the existing laws and national 
ordinances, to adapt them to the changing circumstances, and to extend their application 
to new cases constitutes the cornerstone of property rights protection (Pistor and Xu, 
2002).  
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Courts appear too slow to adapt to changes because they are designed to be 
reactive enforcers in the sense that they would not initiate legal proceedings but only 
respond to the initiation of another party. Moreover, in China, courts lack autonomous 
powers of enforcement, and so, the enforcement of rulings hinges upon the cooperation 
of the state organizations such as the public security bureaus (e.g., Fan, 1985; Lieberthal 
and Oksenberg, 1988; Zhao, 1989; Li, Zhang, and Wang, 1990; Clarke, 1991). In contrast, 
government officials can exercise de facto lawmaking power by adapting rules to 
changing situations on a continuous basis and initiating enforcement procedures. They 
can proactively enforce contracts by interpreting laws and national ordinances, 
monitoring behavior, launching investigation, and sanctioning actions on their own 
initiative (Du and Xu, 2009). 
As a result, we focus mainly on the effectiveness of seeking help from the state as 
the measure of property rights protection. Specifically, we constructed the measure, 
Property Rights, as the response to the question, “Among the government officials that 
your firm regularly interacts with, what is the share that is oriented toward helping rather 
than hindering firms?”  The response varied from 0% to 100%, with mean of 35.5% 
(±32.0%), and where a higher value represented better protection of property rights.  Cull 
and Xu (2005) and Lin, Lin, and Song (2009) used this same measure to study the 
impacts of property rights on reinvestment and R&D investment, respectively. 
In a robustness check, we used the effectiveness of litigation (denoted by 
Litigation) as an alternative measure of property rights protection. Specifically, it was 
measured as the response to the question, “What’s the likelihood that the legal system 
will uphold my contract and property rights in business disputes?”  The response varied 
from 0% to 100%, with a mean value of 63.4% (±38.9%), and where a higher value 
represented better protection of property rights.   
As a preliminary, we verified that the degree of property rights protection was 
indeed grounded in geographical differences.  Appendix A reports a regression of 
Property Rights on industry and city dummies, along with a list of control variables 
related to enterprise and CEO characteristics.  Evidently, there was substantial and 
statistically significant variation in property rights protection across Chinese cities.6  This 
is because, even though China is a unitary state with uniform laws and national 
ordinances, the de facto property rights protection hinges upon the interpretation and 
                                                 
6 Apparently, however, there was no significant systematic variation in property rights protection 
across industries. 
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enforcement of laws and national ordinances by the regional governments. Our measure, 
Property Rights, was based on the enterprise’s overall perception of the effectiveness of 
seeking help from the state, thus capturing the de facto, rather than the de jure, protection 
of property rights.  
In the empirical analysis, we also controlled for other factors that might possibly 
affect enterprise productivity, including enterprise and CEO characteristics that were 
variously used in previous studies of investment and productivity (Cull and Xu 2005; Li, 
Meng, Wang, and Zhou 2008), as well as industry and city dummies.  The enterprise 
characteristics included enterprise size (measured by the logarithm of employment in the 
previous year), enterprise age (measured by the logarithm of years of establishment up to 
the end of 2002), private ownership percentage (measured by the share of equity owned 
by parties other than government agencies), and skilled labor ratio (measured by the ratio 
of skilled labor in the total employment in the previous year).  The CEO characteristics 
included measures of human capital – CEO education (years of schooling), CEO tenure 
(years as CEO), and deputy CEO previously (an indicator of whether the CEO had been 
the deputy CEO of the same enterprise before becoming CEO); and measures of political 
capital – government cadre previously (an indicator of whether the CEO had previously 
been a government official), party member (an indicator of whether the CEO was a 
member of the Chinese Communist Party), and CEO government appointed (an indicator 
of whether the CEO was appointed by the government).  Finally, we included dummy 
variables for industry and city to account for possible differences in enterprise 
productivity across industries and cities. 
In investigating the impact of property rights protection on enterprise productivity, 
the enterprise-level perception of property right protection should yield more precise 
estimates than the city-average perception.  Enterprise-level productivity depends on 
various organizational and strategic decisions – including who to engage as investors and 
partners, whether to use capital or labor-intensive modes of production, how much to out-
source the production of inputs, and whether to distribute through direct or indirect 
channels – all of which depend on the management’s perception of property rights 
protection. 
However, using an enterprise-level measure of property rights may introduce 
endogeneity in the form of omitted variables bias or reverse causality.  For example, even 
with many controls included, there could still be some uncontrolled variables, such as 
favorable individual treatment, which correlate with both enterprise-level measure of 
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property rights protection and enterprise performance.  And it could also be possible that 
more productive enterprises have more resources, such as more political connections, 
which lead to more secure de facto property rights protection.   
To address these endogeneity issues, we applied two-step Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimation using two alternative instruments.  One instrument was the 
average response by enterprises of other industries located in the same city regarding the 
quality of property rights protection.  The other instrument was the logarithm of 
population in the respective city around 1918-19. We discuss the identification strategy 
using these instruments in Section 3.2. 
As a further robustness check, we applied the difference-in-differences estimation 
method of Rajan and Zingales (1998).  First, we tested whether property rights protection 
had differential impacts on enterprises with different degrees of dependence on the 
external environment.  Following Blanchard and Kremer (1997: 1116) and Rajan and 
Subramanian (2007: 323), we used the number of suppliers to operationalize reliance on 
the external environment.7  An enterprise with more suppliers would have a more 
complex production system and supply chain, hence would be more reliant on the 
external environment.  This measure showed substantial variation, with a mean value of 
42 (±199).  Second, following McMillan and Woodruff (2002), we tested whether 
property rights protection had differential impacts on enterprises facing different levels of 
entry barriers. Following Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002), we 
used the number of days to register a new business to operationalize the level of entry 
barriers. This measure also exhibited substantial variation, with a mean value of 8.817 
(±11.811).  
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
 
3.1 OLS Estimation 
 
To investigate the impact of property rights protection on enterprise productivity, we 
used the following basic specification:  
                                                 
7  Owing to data limitations, Blanchard and Kremer (1997) and Rajan and Subramanian (2007) 
used industry-level measures of reliance.  By contrast, our measure was at the enterprise level. 
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                                   ,eiceiceic Ry                                         (1) 
where eicy  is enterprise productivity (i.e., Labor Productivity or Total Factor 
Productivity) of enterprise, e, belonging to industry, i, and located in city, c; μ is a 
constant; eicR  measures the quality of property rights protection as reported at the 
enterprise level (i.e., Property Rights Protection or Litigation); and eic  is an 
independently and identically distributed error with a normal distribution and mean zero. 
To deal with possible heteroskedasticity, we used the robust standard error clustered at 
the industry-city level. 8  
Table 3, column (i), presents OLS estimates of specification (1).  Property rights 
protection had a positive and statistically significant impact on labor productivity.  To 
gauge the economic significance of this result, we calculated that a one standard 
deviation increase in property rights protection was associated with an increase of 0.511 x 
0.320 = 0.164 in labor productivity or 3.8% relative to the mean labor productivity.  This 
impact is reported in the last row of Table 3. 
-- Table 3 --- 
Do these results truly reflect the causal effect of property rights protection on 
labor productivity?  An immediate concern is that the estimates could be biased owing to 
the omission of relevant variables.  Then,  
                                   .0)(  eiceicRE                                        (2) 
To the extent that we can find a comprehensive set of control variables, eicX , and 
coefficients, γ, such that the residual error term,   'eiceiceic X , is not correlated 
with eicR , then we can isolate the causal effect of property rights protection on labor 
productivity (Goldberger, 1972; Barnow et al., 1981).  We specified, as controls, CEO 
characteristics (human capital and political capital), enterprise characteristics (enterprise 
size, enterprise age, private ownership percentage, and skilled labor ratio), industry 
dummies, and city dummies.  Accordingly, the specification was:  
                                                 
8 The standard errors for micro-level data need to be adjusted for the possibility that error terms 
could be correlated within a cluster (Liang and Zeger, 1986). However, when the number of 
clusters is small (specifically, fewer than 42), the clustered standard errors could be misleading 
(e.g., Wooldridge, 2003, 2006a; Angrist and Pischke, 2009). As our study includes just 18 cities 
and 9 industries, we did not use the clustered standard errors at the city-level or industry-level. 
Instead, we used standard errors clustered at the industry-city level.  
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                           .' eiceiceiceic XRy                             (3) 
Table 3, columns (ii)-(vi), reports the results.  To avoid issues of multicollinearity 
and poor controls (Angrist and Pischke, 2009), we included the control variables in a 
stepwise fashion.  Among enterprise characteristics, the coefficient of enterprise size was 
positive and significant in all specifications.  Apparently, enterprises with larger 
workforces exhibited relatively higher labor productivity, suggesting the presence of 
economies of scale.  This would be consistent with evidence of local protectionism within 
China (Young, 2000; Bai, Du, Tao, and Tong, 2004), which would result in production at 
sub-optimal scale.  
The coefficient of enterprise age was negative and significant.  Enterprises with 
longer history exhibited relatively lower labor productivity. This is consistent with the 
experience of China’s economic reform that new firms drove economic development, 
particularly by ending the monopoly of state enterprises (McMillan and Woodruff, 2002). 
The coefficient of skilled labor ratio was positive and significant. Apparently, 
enterprises with more skilled labor exhibited higher labor productivity. This is consistent 
with the importance of skilled labor in less developed countries (e.g., Acemoglu and 
Zilibotti, 2001), and the observed shortage of skilled labor in China (Asian Development 
Bank, 2003; Wang, 2006).  
Among the CEO characteristics, the coefficient of CEO education was positive 
and significant, while the coefficient of government appointment was negative and 
significant in all specifications.  Previous research into education and growth focused on 
the impact of the education of the workforce (e.g., Barro, 2001).  The novelty of our 
result is the impact of the CEO’s education on the overall productivity of the enterprise.  
The negative impact of government appointment is a phenomenon that would be unique 
to a transitional economy.  It is consistent with the view that government appointment of 
CEOs is based on political considerations rather than managerial talent. 
With respect to the central issue, the coefficient of property rights protection was 
positive and statistically significant in all specifications, ranging from 0.245 to 0.448.   
Accordingly, we infer that our finding that property rights protection increased labor 
productivity was robust to the various controls.  
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It is important to note that the magnitude of the impact of property rights 
protection on enterprise productivity was about 21% lower with the inclusion of city 
dummies.  This is consistent with our preliminary analysis, reported in Appendix A, that 
a substantial part of the variation of property rights protection across enterprises was due 
to variation across cities.  It is also consistent with our conjecture that part of the China 
puzzle (that institutions seem unimportant for economic performance) could be explained 
by the concentration of economic activities in geographic areas with better institutions.   
 
3.2  GMM Estimation 
While we included a comprehensive set of control variables, eicX , it could still be 
possible that the residual error, eic , even including the controls eicX , might be correlated 
with the index of property rights protection, eicR , so that 0)(  eiceicRE  , in which case 
the estimates would be biased.  To address this endogeneity issue, we applied the two-
step GMM using two alternative instruments for property rights protection.   
 
3.2.1 Instrumental Variable 1: Average Perceived Property Rights 
Protection Among Other Industries in Same City 
Following the recent literature on empirical industrial organization (e.g., Berry, 
Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995; Nevo, 2000, 2001), we first used the average response of 
enterprises belonging to other industries and located in the same city regarding the 
quality of property rights protection as an instrument for the enterprise-level perception 
of property rights protection.  
Note that with the inclusion of industry and city dummies, the only possible 
remaining omitted variables were at the industry-city level or individual enterprise-level. 
The average perceived property rights protection among enterprises belonging to other 
industries located in the same city should not be correlated with industry-city level or 
individual enterprise-level characteristics, so that the exclusion condition for two-step 
GMM estimation would be satisfied.9  
Meanwhile, the average perception of property rights protection among 
enterprises belonging to other industries located in the same city should be negatively 
                                                 
9  As reported below, we showed formally that the exclusion condition was satisfied. 
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correlated with the enterprise-level perception of property rights protection. With city 
dummies controlling for the absolute levels of property rights protection across different 
cities, the enterprise-level and other industry property rights protection variables are 
deviations from the city averages and so, should sum to zero. Intuitively, the level of 
property rights protection reflects the behavior of government officials and related parties, 
for example, the time and effort devoted by government officials to protecting private 
property. As the city dummies controlled for the total time and effort that government 
officials used to protect private properties across different cities, the inter-industry 
difference within a city reflected the allocation of time and effort across different 
industries within the city. Thus, since the officials’ total time and effort is limited, it 
seems reasonable that if officials put more time and effort in protection of private 
property in one industry, then they would have less for other industries. In other words, 
the instrumental variable should be negatively correlated with the endogenous 
explanatory variable, and so, the relevance condition for the two-step GMM estimation 
would be satisfied.  
-- Table 4 --- 
Table 4, columns (i)-(ii), reports the two-step GMM estimates. We included the 
various control variables -- CEO characteristics, enterprise characteristics, industry 
dummies, and city dummies in all estimates.  Regarding the relevance condition for a 
valid instrument, the correlation between the instrument and the endogenous variable was 
negative and highly significant (as shown in column (i)), consistent with the intuition 
presented above. Moreover, the Anderson canonical correlation LR statistic and the 
Cragg-Donald Wald statistic provided further support for the satisfaction of the relevance 
condition. We also checked for a weak instrument, which was ruled out by the large Shea 
partial R2 and the Cragg-Donald F-statistic.10 
With respect to the central issue, the coefficient of property rights protection, 
instrumented by the average perceived property rights protection among enterprises 
belonging to other industries located in the same city, was positive and statistically 
significant.  The coefficient was 1.331 (± 0.766), which was almost four times larger than 
the OLS estimate.  Correspondingly, the estimated impact of a one standard deviation 
increase in property rights protection on labor productivity was 9.9% of the mean labor 
productivity, which was almost four times larger than the OLS estimate.  Apparently, any 
                                                 
10 The F-statistic was significantly above the critical value of 10 (Staiger and Stock 1997). 
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bias due to endogeneity served to bias the impact of property rights protection downward 
rather than upward.  Another possibility is that there were measurement errors associated 
with the measure of property rights protection, which biased the OLS estimates 
downward towards zero. 
To formally check that the instrumental variable satisfied the exclusion condition, 
i.e., was not correlated with the residual error, eic , we conducted a test following 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002). The premise for the test is that, if the 
instrumental variable affects labor productivity only through property rights protection, 
then instrumental variable should not have any significant impact on labor productivity 
conditional on property rights protection. Indeed, as shown in Table 4, columns (iii)-(iv), 
the instrumental variable had a positive and significant impact on labor productivity, but 
the effect vanished with the inclusion of the explanatory variable, Property Rights 
Protection.  
 
3.2.2 Instrumental Variable 2: City Population Around 1918-19 
Motivated by the literature on economic institutions (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
and Vishny, 1997, 1998; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001, 2002), we developed 
a historical proxy, Rc,history, for the general level of property rights protection in each city.  
A historical proxy should not be correlated with unobserved characteristics of enterprises 
in 2002, and hence should satisfy the exclusion condition, 0)( ,  eichistorycRE  .  
The historical proxy of the city’s property rights protection would arguably be 
correlated with the contemporary level of property rights protection, 0)( ,  chisotryc RRE .  
A large body of empirical work has shown that differences in economic institutions 
across countries persist over time (Young, 1994; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 
2001, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2008).11 Some reasons include the 
                                                 
11 “[A]lthough we commonly described the independent polities as ‘new states’, in reality they 
were successors to the colonial regime, inheriting its structures, its quotidian routines and 
practices, and its more hidden normative theories of governance” (Young, 1994: 283). Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson (2001) discussed three mechanisms that would result in institutional 
persistence: (i) it was costly to set up institutions that restricted government expropriation; (ii) the 
formation of institutions was influenced by the elites which were quite persistent; (iii) the 
established institutions would induce irreversible investments that were complementary to the 
existing institutions, which made people more willing to support those institutions. La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) argued that cultures, religions and ideologies are likely to 
persist over time despite regime changes. 
 16 
 
persistence of culture, beliefs, and ideologies across generations (e.g., Bisin and Verdier, 
2000; Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde, 2006; Tabellini, 2007a, 2007b, 2009).  
Specifically, with regard to China, there is also evidence that geographical 
differences in economic institutions have persisted over time, despite radical changes in 
the political regime, beginning with the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in the early 20th 
century.  For example, areas with higher industrial and commercial activities in the pre-
Communist era were faster and more effective in market reform in recent years (e.g., Zhu, 
2001; Fu, 2003).  And areas with larger population during the Qing Dynasty continue to 
be relatively more prosperous in the Communist era (e.g., Li and Lu, 2009). 
To proxy for the historical level of city's property rights protection, we used the 
logarithm of population in the respective city around 1918-19.  Absent systematic 
national censuses, our source of data on city populations was a study conducted by the 
China Continuation Committee, an organization of Protestant churches and missions 
(Special Committee on Survey and Occupation of China Continuation Committee, 1987). 
The Committee based its estimates on various sources, including reports by police 
commissioners and local missions, the 1910 census by the Ministry of the Interior, and a 
1919-20 census by the Post Office.  Given the fragmentary state of information on 
China's population (Chen 1947; Ho 1959), we believe that the China Continuation 
Committee study is a reasonable source for the population of Chinese cities at the time.  
China was besieged by foreign powers in the late 1800s and early 1900s.  During 
the same period, it was beset by civil war.  Absent a strong central government and in the 
face of financial difficulties, expropriation of private property by regional governments 
was widespread (Wu, 1955; Li, Li, Li, Yang, and Gong, 1994; Dong, Zhang, and Jiao, 
2000).  Given geographical mobility, especially among wealthy people, the population of 
a city in 1918-19 could reasonably reflect the state of property rights protection at that 
time, with a larger population indicating better property rights protection.  Appendix B 
provides the detailed rationale for this proxy.  
-- Table 5 --- 
Table 5, column (i), reports the two-step GMM estimates using the logarithm of 
population in the city around 1918-19 as the instrument for property rights protection. We 
included the various control variables -- CEO characteristics, enterprise characteristics, 
industry dummies, and city characteristics -- in all estimates.  With regard to the 
relevance condition for an effective instrument, the logarithm of population in the city 
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around 1918-19 was highly and positively correlated with the enterprise perception of 
property rights protection.  The condition was further confirmed by the Anderson 
canonical correlation LR statistic and the Cragg-Donald Wald statistic.  Any concern 
about a weak instrument was ruled out by the large Shea partial R2 and the Cragg-Donald 
F-statistic. 
The two-step GMM estimated coefficient of property rights protection, as 
instrumented by the logarithm of population in China's respective city around 1918-19, 
was 4.787 (± 1.487), which was statistically significant.  It was even larger than the 
estimates using the average perceived property rights protection by enterprises of other 
industries located in the same city as the instrument. 
The identification strategy using the logarithm of population in the city around 
1918-19 as the instrumental variable relied on the exclusion restriction, specifically, the 
assumption that the instrument should not affect labor productivity through channels 
other than property rights protection. Intuitively, we did not expect the early 20th century 
population to be correlated with enterprise-level characteristics in 2002. However, since 
the instrumental variable was at the city-level, precluding the use of city dummies, there 
could be some city-level omitted variables through which the instrumental variable might 
affect labor productivity. While we were not able to check the exclusion restriction 
assumption with certainty as the data did not allow us to control for all city-level 
variables, we investigated several city-level factors that might be of particular concern.  
First, the number of population in the city around 1918-19 might be negatively 
determined by the severity of the crime rate, which mjght persist over time. To control 
for this possibility, we included a proxy for the contemporaneous crime rate, specifically, 
the average losses due to theft among other enterprises situated in the same city.  
Second, the population in the city around 1918-19 might be correlated with 
clustering of suppliers in the city, which might persist over time. To control for this 
possibility, we included a proxy for the contemporaneous clustering of suppliers in each 
city, which was measured by the average ratio of suppliers located in the same city over 
the total number of suppliers among other enterprises situated in the city.  
Third, the population in the city around 1918-19 might reflect the behavior of 
government officials and elites towards protection of the local economy in the city, which 
might persist over time. To control for this possibility, we included a proxy for the 
contemporaneous degree of local protectionism in each city, which was measured by the 
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average ratio of state ownership among other enterprises situated in the city, following 
Bai et al. (2004) and Lu and Tao (2009b). 
We, stepwisely, included the above three city-level variables, along with the 
controls for CEO and enterprise characteristics, industry dummies and city characteristics. 
Table 5, columns (ii)-(iv), reports the results. It is clear that our central findings regarding 
the importance of property rights protection for labor productivity was robust to the 
inclusion of these additional controls.  
 
3.3  Difference-in-Differences Estimation 
As an alternative way to check the causal impact of property rights protection on 
enterprise productivity, we applied the difference-in-differences estimation strategy 
pioneered by Rajan and Zingales (1998). This approach establishes causality by focusing 
on the details of theoretical mechanisms through which property rights protection may 
affect enterprise productivity.  
Our first hypothesis is that the impact of property rights protection on productivity 
varies across enterprises according to their degree of reliance on the external environment.  
The impact of private property protection would be higher on an enterprise with a greater 
reliance on the external environment. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that enterprises 
which are more reliant on the external environment should exhibit relatively higher labor 
productivity in cities with stronger property rights protection.  
Following Blanchard and Kremer (1997) and Rajan and Subramanian (2007), we 
used the number of suppliers to measure, for each enterprise, its reliance on the external 
environment.  Accordingly, we estimated the following equation:  
                     ,' eiceiceiceiceiceiceic XSRSRy         (4) 
where eicS  measures the reliance on the external environment at the enterprise level 
(Supplier); eicX  is a vector of controls (CEO and enterprise characteristics, industry 
dummies, and city dummies); and eic  is an independently and identically distributed 
error with a normal distribution and mean zero. 
Table 6, column (i), reports the OLS estimate of (4).  Labor productivity was 
positively associated with property rights protection and also the degree of external 
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dependence, as measured by the number of suppliers.  More importantly, the impact of 
property rights protection on labor productivity significantly increased with reliance on 
the external environment. In terms of economic magnitude, the impact of a one standard 
deviation improvement in property rights protection on labor productivity was 0.080, or 
3.1% of the mean labor productivity, at the mean number of suppliers. 12 
-- Table 6 --- 
Our second hypothesis was that the impact of property rights protection on 
enterprise productivity varied across enterprises facing different levels of entry barriers. 
According to McMillan and Woodruff (2002), severer expropriation of property rights 
increases the entry costs, leading to less competition and lower productivity. With the 
same level of improvement in property rights protection, the percentage of reduction in 
entry costs is smaller for enterprises with higher levels of entry barriers than for those 
with lower levels of entry barriers. Thus, it is expected that the enterprises facing lower 
levels of entry barriers should exhibit relatively higher labor productivity in cities with 
stronger property rights protection.  
Following Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002), we used the 
number of days to register a new business to measure, for each enterprise, the level of 
entry barriers. Accordingly, we estimated the following equation:  
                     ,' eiceiceiceiceiceiceic XEBREBRy      (5) 
where eicEB  measures the level of entry barrier at the enterprise level; eicX  is a vector of 
controls (CEO and enterprise characteristics, industry dummies, and city dummies); and 
eic  is an independently and identically distributed error with a normal distribution and 
mean zero. 
Table 6, column (ii), reports the OLS estimate of (5).  The impact of property 
rights protection on labor productivity was larger for enterprises facing lower levels of 
entry barriers. In terms of economic magnitude, the impact of a one standard deviation 
                                                 
12 In the interaction between property rights protection and the number of suppliers, the number 
of suppliers was specified as its difference from the sample mean (Wooldridge, 2006b: 204-205). 
Hence, the coefficient of property rights protection represents the partial effect of property rights 
protection on labor productivity at the mean number of suppliers. 
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improvement in property rights protection on labor productivity was 0.034, or 2.2% of 
the mean labor productivity, at the mean level of entry barriers. 13 
Overall, the two-step GMM estimates and the difference-in-differences estimates 
reinforced the OLS estimates: stronger property rights protection led to higher enterprise 
productivity. Our result from the enterprise-level analysis is consistent with the general 
findings in the literature regarding the impacts of institutions on economic growth 
obtained from the macro-level analysis (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001, 
2002; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). In terms of specific mechanisms through which 
property rights protection affects enterprise productivity, two channels -- reliance on 
external environment and entry barriers —appear to be important. Another channel might 
be the positive impact of property rights protection on investment incentives (e.g., 
Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff, 2002; Cull and Xu, 2005) and R&D investment (Lin, 
Lin, and Song, 2009), both of which subsequently lead to higher enterprise productivity.   
 
3.4 Robustness Checks 
We conducted four other sets of robustness checks of the impact of property rights 
protection on enterprise productivity.  First, we re-estimated equation (3) using two 
alternative measures of enterprise productivity, viz., total factor productivity calculated 
using either the panel fixed-effects method or the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)  
Methodology.  Table 7, columns (i)-(ii), reports the results.  Clearly, our earlier finding 
regarding the impact of property rights protection on enterprise productivity was robust to 
these alternative measures of productivity.   
Next, we used an alternative measure of property rights protection, Litigation, 
measured as the perceived likelihood that the legal system would uphold contract and 
property rights in business disputes.  Table 7, column (iii), reports OLS estimates using 
this alternative measure of property rights protection. Our earlier finding regarding the 
                                                 
13 In the interaction between property rights protection and the level of entry barriers, the level of 
entry barriers was specified as its difference from the sample mean (Wooldridge, 2006b: 204-
205). Hence, the coefficient of property rights protection represents the partial effect of property 
rights protection on labor productivity at the mean level of entry barriers. 
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impact of property rights protection on enterprise productivity was robust to this 
alternative measure of property rights.14  
Another concern might be that our results were driven by particular outliers.  To 
address this issue, we used the quantile regression to estimate specification (3).  Table 7, 
column (iv), reports the results. Our earlier finding regarding the impact of property 
rights protection on labor productivity was robust to outliers. 
Finally, yet another concern might be that our results could be biased due to the 
inclusion of state-owned enterprises. This is because state-owned enterprises conduct 
business under the auspices of national and regional governments (thus enjoying better de 
facto property rights protection), and they have lower productivity due to the multiple 
responsibilities that they are charged with (Bai, Li, Tao, and Wang, 2000). To rule out 
this concern, we restricted our sample to private enterprises, which were defined as those 
enterprises with more than 50% percentage of private ownership.  Table 7, column (v), 
reports the results. Clearly, our earlier finding regarding the impact of property rights 
protection on labor productivity was robust to this subsample.  In terms of economic 
magnitude, the impact of a one standard deviation improvement in property rights 
protection on labor productivity was 0.097, or 6.2% of the mean labor productivity. 
Consistent with intuition, this value was significantly higher than that obtained from the 
whole sample (see Table 3, column (vi)).  
 
4. Conclusion 
It is widely believed that China's spectacular growth in the last thirty years contradicts the 
prevailing view of the importance of institutions to economic performance (Blanchard 
and Kremer 1997; Rodrik 2004a and 2004b; Allen, Qian, and Qian 2005; Economist, 
March 15, 2008).  Indeed, protection of private property was not formally written into 
China's constitution until 2004, and its legal institutions were rather weak.  
Using data from a World Bank survey of 1,566 manufacturing enterprises in 18 
Chinese cities, we found that property rights protection had a positive and statistically 
                                                 
14  In unreported estimates, we found that Litigation was statistically insignificant with the 
inclusion of Property Rights Protection (which was measured by the effectiveness of seeking help 
from the government officials).. This finding suggested that indeed, the protection of private 
property hinged upon the state, which is consistent with the previous literature and observations 
in China.  
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significant impact on enterprise productivity.  These results were robust to the inclusion 
of a comprehensive list of controls related to CEO and enterprise characteristics, as well 
as industry and city dummies.  
To further establish the causal impacts of property rights protection on enterprise 
productivity, we applied two-step GMM estimation with two alternative instruments, viz, 
the average perception of property rights protection among other enterprises belonging to 
other industries located in the same city, and the logarithm of population in the respective 
city around 1918-19. The two-step GMM estimates reinforced our findings that property 
rights protection had a positive and significant causal impact on productivity. 
In addition, we applied difference-in-differences estimation (Rajan and Zingales, 
1998) to further establish causality by focusing on the theoretical mechanisms through 
which property rights protection might affect enterprise performance.  We found that 
enterprises which were more reliant on the external environment exhibited relatively 
higher productivity in cities with stronger property rights protection. We also found that 
enterprises which faced lower levels of entry barriers exhibited relatively higher 
productivity in cities with stronger property rights protection.  
 
In further robustness checks, we explored alternative measures of productivity 
and property rights protection, used the quantile regression to deal with possible impact 
of outlying observations, and investigated whether the results were biased due to the 
inclusion of state-owned enterprises.  
Finally, we did find evidence that property rights protection was, to some extent, 
correlated with geography.  This would be consistent with the explanation of China’s 
growth as being concentrated in the coastal areas, where institutional quality is relatively 
higher.   
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Notes: 
1. Number of suppliers was specified as its difference from the sample mean. 
2. Entry barriers were specified as their difference from the sample mean. 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Labor productivity 1557 4.322 1.562 -3.989 11.893
Total factor productivity (fixed effect) 1356 4.151 1.077 -0.983 11.069
Total factor productivity (LP) 1356 3.042 0.953 -2.363 10.123
Property rights protection 1462 0.355 0.320 0.000 1.000 
Court litigation 1361 0.634 0.389 0.000 1.000C
Average perceived property rights 
protection among other industries in same 
city 
1566 0.349 0.106 0.175 0.623 
Logarithm of population in 1918-19 1437 11.926 0.836 10.463 13.385
Enterprise size 1563 5.040 1.454 0.000 9.899 
Enterprise age 1566 2.494 0.777 1.099 3.970 
Private ownership percentage 1566 0.813 0.376 0.000 1.000 
Skilled labor ratio 1542 0.026 0.060 0.000 1.000 
CEO education 1553 15.359 2.511 0.000 19.000
CEO tenure 1548 6.240 4.580 1.000 33.000
Deputy CEO previously 1548 0.280 0.449 0.000 1.000 
Government cadre previously 1548 0.036 0.185 0.000 1.000 
Party member  1524 0.648 0.478 0.000 1.000 
Government appointed CEO 1544 0.243 0.429 0.000 1.000 
Number of suppliers (in thousands) 1509 0.042 0.199 0.000 7.100 
Entry barriers 778 8.817 11.811 0.000 100.000
Property rights protection x suppliers1 1423 0.000 0.044 -0.041 0.825 
Property rights protection x entry barriers2 733 -0.380 4.284 -8.817 28.414
 29 
 
Table 2. Correlations 
 
 
 
  
Labor 
productivity
Total factor 
productivity 
(fixed 
effect) 
Total factor 
productivity 
(LP) 
Property 
rights 
protection Court litigation 
Average 
perceived 
property 
rights 
protection 
among other 
industries in 
same city 
Logarithm of 
population in 
1918-19 
Labor productivity 1.000       
Total factor productivity (fixed effect) 0.821 1.000      
Total factor productivity (LP) 0.820 0.968 1.000     
Property rights protection 0.109 0.097 0.082 1.000    
Court litigation 0.095 0.074 0.053 0.258 1.000   
Average perceived property rights 
protection among other industries in 
same city 
0.113 0.116 0.088 0.257 0.155 1.000  
Logarithm of population in 1918-19 0.132 0.157 0.125 0.090 0.064 0.299 1.000 
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Table 3.  OLS estimates 
 
  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
Dependent variable Labor productivity 
Property rights protection 0.511*** 0.448*** 0.426*** 0.321** 0.309** 0.245** 
 [0.142] [0.142] [0.138] [0.130] [0.118] [0.104] 
CEO characteristics       
Human capital       
CEO education  0.152*** 0.154*** 0.101*** 0.077*** 0.068*** 
  [0.019] [0.019] [0.020] [0.021] [0.020] 
CEO tenure  -0.020** -0.009 0.008 0.016* 0.001 
   [0.009] [0.010] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] 
Deputy CEO previously  -0.183** -0.022 0.075 0.038 0.026 
   [0.078] [0.082] [0.077] [0.077] [0.071] 
Political capital       
Government cadre previously   0.036 0.044 0.075 0.133 
   [0.213] [0.188] [0.170] [0.176] 
Party member   -0.250*** -0.175** -0.177** -0.051 
   [0.093] [0.087] [0.078] [0.073] 
CEO government appointed   -0.635*** -0.308*** -0.309*** -0.260** 
    [0.099] [0.110] [0.104] [0.111] 
Enterprise characteristics       
Enterprise size    0.249*** 0.237*** 0.139*** 
     [0.039] [0.040] [0.038] 
Enterprise age    -0.555*** -0.528*** -0.455*** 
    [0.071] [0.069] [0.065] 
Private ownership percentage    0.146 0.156 0.170 
    [0.139] [0.141] [0.137] 
Skilled labor ratio    2.756*** 2.110** 2.023*** 
    [0.751] [0.853] [0.763] 
Industry characteristics       
Industry dummies     Yes Yes 
City characteristics       
City dummies      Yes 
Constant 4.139*** 2.004*** 2.172*** 2.695*** 2.968*** 2.621*** 
 [0.110] [0.333] [0.324] [0.386] [0.459] [0.527] 
No. of observations 1453 1424 1385 1369 1369 1369 
R2 0.0111 0.0828 0.1221 0.2106 0.2587 0.334 
p-value for F-test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Impact of property rights 
protection2 0.164 0.143 0.136 0.103 0.099 0.078 
Notes: 
1. Standard errors, clustered at the industry-city level, are reported in the bracket; *, 
**, *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
2. Impact as measured by a one standard deviation increase in Property Rights 
Protection.   
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Table 4.  GMM estimates: Property rights protection as perceived by others 
 
  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Estimation specification GMM OLS 
 First stage Second stage   
Dependent variable 
Property rights 
protection 
Labor 
productivity Labor productivity 
Property rights protection  1.331*  0.201* 
  [0.766]  [0.108] 
Average perceived property rights 
protection among other industries in 
same city 
-3.063***  -4.077* -3.462 
 [0.239]  [2.386] [2.468] 
CEO characteristics     
Human capital     
CEO education 0.004 0.063*** 0.068*** 0.067*** 
 [0.004] [0.021] [0.020] [0.020] 
CEO tenure 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
  [0.002] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
Deputy CEO previously -0.022 0.046 0.017 0.021 
  [0.016] [0.069] [0.072] [0.072] 
Political capital     
Government cadre previously -0.065 0.189 0.103 0.116 
 [0.055] [0.182] [0.178] [0.177] 
Party member -0.018 -0.032 -0.055 -0.052 
 [0.019] [0.070] [0.073] [0.073] 
Government appointed CEO 0.006 -0.253** -0.245** -0.246** 
  [0.022] [0.103] [0.113] [0.112] 
Enterprise characteristics     
Enterprise size 0.012 0.128*** 0.144*** 0.141*** 
  [0.008] [0.041] [0.038] [0.038] 
Enterprise age -0.008 -0.444*** -0.455*** -0.454*** 
 [0.013] [0.064] [0.067] [0.066] 
Private ownership percentage 0.007 0.175 0.185 0.183 
 [0.033] [0.127] [0.138] [0.136] 
Skilled labor ratio 0.023 1.947*** 1.977** 1.973** 
 [0.148] [0.697] [0.781] [0.767] 
Industry characteristics     
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City characteristics     
City dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.493*** 3.190*** 6.472*** 3.779*** 
 [0.107] [0.508] [1.048] [0.975] 
Tests     
Relevance tests     
Anderson canonical correlations LR 
statistic [44.08]*** - - - 
Cragg-Donald Wald statistic [55.30]*** - - - 
Weak instrument tests     
Shea partial R2 0.0392 - - - 
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Cragg-Donald F-statistic [53.29] - - - 
No. of observations 1369 1369 1369 1369 
Impact of property rights protection2 - 0.426 - - 
Notes: 
1. Standard errors, clustered at the industry-city level, are reported in the bracket; *, **, *** 
represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
2. Impact as measured by a one standard deviation increase in Property Rights Protection.   
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 Table 5.  GMM estimates: Historical population 
 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Second Stage: Dependent Variable: Labor productivity 
Property rights protection 4.787*** 4.193*** 4.105*** 3.590*** 
  [1.487] [1.265] [1.407] [1.107] 
Losses due to theft  19.958 20.284 21.856 
  [16.591] [16.982] [16.103] 
Clustering of suppliers   -0.509 -0.804 
   [1.265] [1.164] 
Local protectionism    0.820 
    [0.674] 
Controls     
Enterprise characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CEO characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Logarithm of GDP per capita Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Impact of property rights protection2 1.532 1.342 1.314 1.149 
First Stage: Dependent Variable: Property rights protection 
Logarithm of population in 1918-19 0.044*** 0.050*** 0.046*** 0.063*** 
  [0.015] [0.015] [0.014] [0.012] 
Losses due to theft  -4.304 -3.840 -6.263* 
  [3.287] [3.229] [3.268] 
Clustering of suppliers   -0.388** -0.322* 
   [0.161] [0.172] 
Local protectionism    -0.560*** 
    [0.155] 
Controls     
Enterprise characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CEO characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Logarithm of GDP per capita Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tests     
Relevance tests     
Anderson canonical correlations LR statistic [14.61]*** [18.52]*** [15.85]*** [24.78]*** 
Cragg-Donald Wald statistic [14.87]*** [19.10]*** [16.29]*** [27.49]*** 
Weak instrument tests     
Shea partial R2 0.0114 0.0148 0.0127 0.0215 
Cragg-Donald F-statistic [14.46] [18.56] [15.81] [26.67] 
No. of observations 1268 1247 1234 1234 
Notes: 
1. Standard errors, clustered at the industry-city level, are reported in the bracket; *, **, *** 
represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
2. Impact as measured by a one standard deviation increase in Property Rights Protection.  
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Table 6.  Difference-in-differences estimates 
 
 (i) (ii) 
Dependent variable Labor productivity 
Property rights protection 0.253** 0.106 
 [0.105] [0.158] 
Number of suppliers (in thousands) 0.094  
 [0.141]  
Property rights protection  Supplier2 3.476***  
 [0.845]  
Entry barriers  0.006 
  [0.006] 
Property rights protection  Entry barriers3  -0.036* 
  [0.018] 
Controls   
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
City dummies Yes Yes 
Enterprise characteristics Yes Yes 
CEO characteristics Yes Yes 
No. of observations 1337 689 
R2 0.3430 0.3495 
p-value for F-test 0.0000 0.0000 
Impact of property rights protection4 0.080 0.034 
Notes: 
1. Standard errors, clustered at the industry-city level, are reported in the bracket; *, **, *** 
represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
2. Number of suppliers was specified as its difference from the sample mean. 
3. Entry barriers was specified as its difference from the sample mean. 
4. Impact as measured by a one standard deviation increase in Property Rights Protection at 
the mean value of Suppliers/Entry barriers.  
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Table 7.  Robustness checks 
 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (iv) 
Estimation specification OLS Quantile OLS 
Sample Whole sample Private firm 
Dependent variable 
Total factor 
productivity 
(fixed 
effect) 
Total factor 
productivity 
(LP) Labor productivity 
Property rights protection 0.178** 0.153*  0.263* 0.302** 
 [0.085] [0.083]  [0.141] [0.130] 
Litigation   0.178*   
   [0.103]   
Controls      
Enterprise characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CEO characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 1205 1205 1274 1369 1120 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.442 0.3211 0.3206 0.2020 0.3353 
p-value for F-test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - 0.0000 
Impact of property rights protection 
/litigation2 0.036 0.049 0.036 0.084 0.097 
Notes: 
1. Standard errors, clustered at the industry-city level, are reported in the bracket; *, **, *** 
represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
2. Impact as measured by a one standard deviation increase in Property Rights Protection or 
Litigation.  
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Appendix A. Geographic difference of property rights protection 
 
(i) 
 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Property rights 
protection  
F-tests  
Industry dummies=0 [1.28] 
City dummies=0 [15.03]*** 
Controls  
Enterprise characteristics Yes 
CEO characteristics Yes 
No. of observations 1377 
R2 0.1114 
Notes: 
Standard errors, clustered at the industry-city level, are reported in the parentheses; *, **, *** 
represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
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Appendix B. Population as a proxy for property rights protection 
During the late Qing Dynasty (1840-1911), China was defeated in a series of wars against 
foreign colonial powers, including two Opium wars with Britain, the Sino-Japanese War of 
1894-95, and the Boxer Rebellion.  In the wake of military defeats, the Qing government was 
forced to sign unequal treaties, conceding huge amounts of reparations as well as territorial and 
other concessions.   For example, following the Boxer Rebellion, eight colonial powers attacked 
Beijing and forced the Qing government to sign the Peace Treaty of 1901, which stipulated 
reparations of 450 million taels of silver (Fan, 1955).  
The total amount of reparations over 1840-1911 amounted to 30 times the annual treasury 
income in 1840 or 15 times the annual treasury income in 1890 (Li, Li, Li, Yang, and Gong, 
1994).  In order to finance the war reparations, the Qing government imposed levies and taxes on 
the population, while delegating responsibility for collection to regional governors.  Given the 
right to collect revenues, however, the regional governors seized the opportunity to determine the 
size of levies and taxes, leading to variations in taxation across China’s regions.  
 
In 1911, the Qing Dynasty was overthrown and a republican government was established 
in Nanjing.  The new government enacted statutes providing for the protection of private 
property (Dong, Zhang, and Jiao, 2000).  However, the republican government failed to secure 
national unity.  Following the death of President Yuan Shih Kai in 1916, China split into north 
and south, with each part further divided into various regions. 
The regional authorities were called “warlords” as they maintained their own armies and 
fought against rivals and one another.  Regional wars caused widespread depredation of 
agricultural and other land.  The warlords further increased taxes and levies to finance their 
expenditures.  In some regions, after 1911, land taxes increased by over 50% (Li, Li, Li, Yang, 
and Gong, 1994).  The incessant fighting and the increasing burden of taxes and levies prompted 
internal migration of people away from war-ridden regions.  This led to the concentration of 
population and wealth in areas that offered better security of person and property (Wu, 1955).15  
Accordingly, the population of a city in 1918-19 could reasonably reflect the state of 
property rights at that time, with a larger population indicating better protection of property 
rights.16 
                                                 
15 See Rawski (1989) for the overall economic history of China during the Republican period. 
16 Superficially, our argument may appear to differ from that of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002), 
who argued that high population density in 1500 was correlated with weak property rights institutions.  
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However, the underlying theory is the same.  In Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002), high 
population density was a precondition for expropriation.  By contrast, we use population to reflect the 
equilibrium state of property rights. 
